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At the heart of the Dartmouth College campus, sheltered by Webster Hall’s
portico, a bronze plaque reads: “Founded by Eleazer Wheelock; Refounded by
Daniel Webster.”1 A reference to the Dartmouth College case, the inscription
commemorates the decision’s pivotal role in the school’s survival. The Supreme
Court decision’s transformational impact, however, extends far beyond Hanover.
I.

F OR G I N G T H E C ON C E P T OF A P R I V A T E C H A R I T A B L E C OR P OR A T I ON

Before the Supreme Court decided the Dartmouth College case in 1819, American
common law jurisprudence did not clearly distinguish between public and private
institutions of higher learning.2 Neither state legislatures nor courts addressed
whether state-chartered charitable institutions remained “public”—and subject to
plenary legislative oversight—if their funding sources were private.3 Moreover,
even if privately funded eleemosynary corporations could be called “private,” it was
unclear what protections, if any, that designation conferred against state
interference.4

1

Maurice G. Baxter, Daniel Webster & the Supreme Court 109 (1966).

2

See Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 1 N.H. 111 (1817). The opinion of New
Hampshire’s highest court, the Superior Court of Judicature, declined to address the broader legal
question concerning the difference, if any, between public and private colleges. Focusing on the
facts of the case before it, the court noted that “whether an incorporated college . . . must be
viewed as a public or as a private corporation” in all cases “it is not necessary now to decide,
because it does not appear that Dartmouth College was subject to any private visitation whatever.”
See also George Thomas, Rethinking the Dartmouth College Case in American Political Development:
Constituting Public and Private Education Institutions, in 29 Studies in American Political
Development 23, 24 (2015) (noting “the distinction between ‘public’ and ‘private’ educational
institutions does not accurately capture American colleges in existence in the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries”); John S. Whitehead & Jurgen Herbst, How to Think About the Dartmouth
College Case, in 26 Hist. of Educ. Quart. 333, 333–34, 343 (1986) (Whitehead asserting that, far from
existing prior to the 1819, the distinction between private and public institutions did not develop
until after the Civil War; both authors acknowledge, however, that the Supreme Court’s decision
in Dartmouth College is a major obstacle to overcome in this argument).
3

See generally John S. Whitehead, The Separation of College and State: Columbia,
Dartmouth, Harvard and Yale, 1776-1876, 9–52 (1973) (recounting history of “alliances between
college and states, 1775-1820,” and noting uncertainty regarding state authority in the absence of
acquiescence by the college).

4

Id. See also Adam Winkler, We the Corporations: How American Businesses Won
Their Civil Rights 78 (2018) (discussing how, before the Dartmouth College case, “[t]he contract
clause only protected private parties, like individuals, from having their existing contracts
interfered with by the government.”); id. at 80 (noting that the idea “that corporations were private

28

THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CASE AND THE FOUNDING OF
HISTORICALLY BLACK COLLEGES

A 1790 decision by Virginia’s highest court crystallized the legal issue and
presaged (not coincidentally) the Dartmouth College case.5 In Bracken v. Visitors of
William and Mary College, the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that state
courts could not interfere with the governance of the College of William and Mary
because it was a “private Eleemosynary institution” founded with “mere charitable
donations.”6 The Court agreed with the attorney for William and Mary, future Chief
Justice John Marshall,7 that the “bounty” the Virginia legislature subsequently
contributed was just one more “donation to an old foundation” that, “though made
by the public,” did not change the College’s fundamental identity.8 Nor did it matter
that William and Mary’s purpose of higher education “concern[ed] the public.”9 The
1790 decision noted in passing that often “[c]olleges and hospitals are classed
together as private . . . [and are] subject to the will of the founder.”10
But the Virginia Court’s understanding was far from universally accepted. In
1804, the United States Supreme Court held that “the act of incorporation which
gives it existence,” not its founding funding source, determined a state-chartered
insurance company’s public or private status.11 This was the view adopted by New
Hampshire’s highest court, the Superior Court of Judicature, in the first stage of the
Dartmouth College case.12
The New Hampshire Court noted that Dartmouth College’s purpose was plainly
public;13 the College was founded, in the words of its Charter, “for the education
entities immunized by the Constitution’s contract clause from state takeover” was “a principle the
law had never previously recognized explicitly” prior to the case).
5

Bracken v. Visitors of William & Mary Coll., 7 Va. (3 Call) 573 (1790).

6

Id. at 591–93.

7

The 35-year-old Marshall had studied law and been elected to the Phil Beta Kappa Society at
William and Mary, see https://law.wm.edu/about/ourhistory/John%20Marshall,%20the%20Great
%20Chief%20Justice.php [https://perma.cc/U6MF-H47L] (last visited Sept. 14, 2019). The future
Chief Justice’s arguments to Virginia’s highest court “foreshadowed his reasoning in the
Dartmouth case,” Edwin D. Duryea and Donald T. Williams, The Academic Corporation: A
History of College and University Governing Boards 111 (2013). See also Florian Bartosic,
With John Marshall from William and Mary to Dartmouth College, 7 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 259, 266 (1966)
(noting that John Marshall faced the same issue both as attorney and as Chief Justice).
8

Bracken, 7 Va. at 591–93.

9

Id. at 593.

10

Id. at 591.

11

Head & Amory v. Providence Ins. Co., 2 Cranch 127, 128 (1804).

12

Trustees, 1 N.H. at 120 (stating “if such a corporation [as Dartmouth] is not to be considered
as a public corporation, it would be difficult to find one that could be so considered.”).

13

Id. at 117–20.
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[and] instruction of [y]outh of the [I]ndian tribes . . . and also of English youth and
any others.”14 Though the Court speculated that “whether a corporation is to be
considered as public or private, depends on the objects for which its franchises are
to be exercised,”15 it found that Dartmouth’s public purpose alone was not
dispositive.16 Instead, the terms of a corporation’s charter determined its public or
private identity.17 If the charter conferred property rights and beneficial interests
to the chartering state, the corporation was public.18 If these rights belonged to the
incorporators, the corporation was private. 19 The unanimous opinion, written by
the well-respected Chief Justice William Richardson, concluded that Dartmouth
could not be classified as a private institution because its trustees had no “private
beneficial interest, either in their franchises or [the] property [of the College].”20
Indeed, the New Hampshire Court held that the Dartmouth trustees, as fiduciaries
of a public corporation, were ipso facto public officers of the state.21
When the Dartmouth College case reached the Supreme Court, the Justices
rejected the New Hampshire Court’s conclusion that Dartmouth was a public
institution. Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion was narrow. It was limited to this
publicly chartered “eleemosynary” institution and stated that “it can require no
argument to prove, that the circumstances of this case constitute a
contract . . . . Dartmouth College is really endowed to private individuals . . . it is
then an eleemosynary . . . and so far as respects its funds, a private corporation.”22
14

Charter of Dartmouth College (1769), https://www.dartmouth.edu/~trustees/docs/
charter-2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/XS5S-VK66], cited in Trustees, 1 N.H. at 118.

15

Trustees, 1 N.H. at 117–18.

16

Id. at 118–20.

17

Id.

18

Id. at 119–20.

19

Id. at 116–17, 120 (“Public corporations are those which are created for public purposes, and
whose . . . corporators have no private beneficial interest, either in their franchises of their
property . . . A gift to a corporation created for public purposes is in reality a gift to the
public . . . [If] such a corporation [as Dartmouth were] not to be considered as a public
corporation, it would be difficult to find one that could be so considered.”).
20

Id. at 117.

21

Id. at 119 (“The office of trustee of Dartmouth College is, in fact, a public trust, as much so as
the office of governor, or of judge of this court”).
22

Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 627, 633–34 (1819). See also Christopher
M. Joseph, Joseph Story and the Dartmouth College Case: Expansion of the Contract Clause, 1 Fairmount
Folio: J. History 17, 21 (1996) (noting that Marshall, instead of making a broad vested rights
argument, “focused on the contract clause’s application to Dartmouth College as a private
eleemosynary institution.”).
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Justice Marshall echoed the decision of Virginia’s highest court in 1790: because of
its private founding and funding, the institution was private, 23 despite its public
charter and purpose.24 Accordingly, the Constitution's Contracts Clause protected
Dartmouth’s contracts—including, according to the Court, the Charter the British
Crown granted it in 1769—from unilateral modification by the State of New
Hampshire.25
II. JUSTICE STORY’S EXPANSIVE UNDERSTANDING OF CORPORATE CIVIL
RIGHTS

By its terms, Justice Marshall’s opinion applied only to private, eleemosynary
institutions. But Justice Joseph Story’s concurring opinion pronounced that the
Court’s Dartmouth College decision liberated all private corporations, whether
commercial or charitable.26 In Story’s view, only where a corporation’s “whole
interests and franchises [were] the exclusive property and domain of the
government itself” could the government “regulate, control and direct the
corporation.”27 Both Justices embraced Daniel Webster’s argument that, just as
states could not revoke a land grant recipient’s property rights, they could not
infringe on a private corporation’s privileges once conferred by contract, without
having reserved that power explicitly.28 As historians Oscar Handlin and Mary F.

23

Trustees, 17 U.S. at 632–35.

24

See R. Kent Newmyer, Justice Joseph Story’s Doctrine of Public and Private Corporations and the Rise
of the American Business Corporation, 25 DePaul L. Rev. 825, 831 (1976) [hereinafter, Newmyer, Justice
Joseph Story’s Doctrine] (noting that Chief Justice Marshall in Dartmouth College “ignor[ed] his own
statement in Providence Insurance Co.” by maintaining that funding source determines
corporate status). See also id. at 826–28 (discussing the evolution of the Court’s conception of
corporate status leading up to the Dartmouth College case).

25

Trustees, 17 U.S. at 645, 652, 654 (finding a violation of Article 1, Section 10 of the United States
Constitution, which prohibits states from passing any “Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts”).

26

Id. at 666, 668–69 (Story, J., concurring) (“[S]trictly speaking, public corporations are such
only as are founded by the government, for public purposes, where the whole interests belong also
the government. If, therefore, the foundation be private, though under the charter of the
government, the corporation is private, however extensive the uses may be to which it is devoted,
either by the bounty of the founder, or the nature and objects of the institution.”).
27

Id. at 671–72; see also Francis N. Stites, Private Interest & Public Gain: the Dartmouth
College Case, 1819 at 84–85 (1972) (discussing Justice Story’s view of private property and
corporations, as well as his expansion of the case’s holding to encompass all corporations).

28

Trustees, 17 U.S. at 567–68 (Marshall, C.J.); id. at 682 (Story, J., concurring). See also Winkler,
supra note 4, at 82 (discussing Webster’s argument that, as with private property, lawmakers could
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Handlin explained in 1953, “[When] Marshall and Story held in 1819 that the charter
was a contract protected by the Federal Constitution . . . a sturdy bulwark against
legislative interference [was] erected around the corporation.”29 The Handlins’
interpretation endures; published last year, economic historian Adam Winkler’s
history of U.S. corporate law concludes that Dartmouth College “fundamentally
reconceived the nature of the American corporation.”30
This canonical interpretation of the case’s significance tends to emphasize how
its protections against government interference transformed American corporate
law and the national economy. Private corporations grew in number, size, and
power after the Dartmouth College decision, buttressed by its new property
protections.31
But exclusive focus on the case’s implications for private corporations serving
private purposes misses its import for other types of private institutions: those, like
Dartmouth, engaged in higher education. In the Dartmouth College decision, the
Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged a category of corporation for the first
time—what Marshall called “private eleemosynary institutions,” and what we now
call private charitable corporations or private nonprofits. Despite serving public
purposes, these private institutions were still, in Marshall’s words, “artificial
being[s];”32 they were “no more a state instrument, than a natural person [pursuing
public goals like education] would be.”33
The idea of an “artificial” person was not new.34 In constitutionalizing the
concept, however, the Supreme Court insulated private educational entities from
not “lawfully snatch away” the rights conferred by a corporation’s charter); id. at 87 (discussing
Justice Story’s “reservation clause”); R. Kent Newmyer, John Marshall as a Transitional Jurist:
Dartmouth College v. Woodward and the Limits of Omniscient Judging, 32 Conn. L. Rev. 1665, 1673
(2000) (discussing Justice Story’s focus on a corporation’s character being determined by its
founding financial sources); Newmyer, Justice Joseph Story’s Doctrine, supra note 24, at 832–36 (1976)
(discussing Justice Story’s strategic vision for how the Dartmouth College case would transform
corporate law and lead to growth in use of the corporate form in the United States).
29

Oscar Handlin and Mary F. Handlin, Origins of the American Business Corporation, in
Enterprise and Secular Change 119 (Frederic C. Lane and Jelle C. Riemersma, eds., 1953).
30

Winkler, supra note 4, at 85–86.

31

Id. at 87. See also Art. IV: Manufacturing Corporations, 2 Am. Jurist & L. Mag. 92, 94 (Jul. 1829)
(providing a contemporaneous account of the growth in private corporations in America,
especially compared to other countries like England, in the decade following the Dartmouth College
decision).
32

Trustees, 17 U.S. at 636, 638 (Marshall, C.J.).

33

Id. at 636. See also id. at 645 (declaring that “the law of this case is the law of all.”).

34

Newmyer, Justice Joseph Story’s Doctrine, supra note 24, at 837.
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government interference and provided a legal pathway for them to claim many of
the same civil rights the Constitution bestowed on natural persons.35
Justice Story himself recognized the potential civil rights significance of the
Dartmouth College decision. In a private letter to legal scholar and jurist, Chancellor
James Kent of New York, Story expressed his hope that the Dartmouth College
decision would shield all non-state institutions from “any undue encroachments
upon [their] civil rights, which the passions or the popular doctrines of the day may
stimulate our State Legislatures to adopt.”36
As Justice Story described, the Dartmouth College case involved a state
government seeking to secularize and broaden an institution’s curriculum and
public role. The Jeffersonian Republicans had ousted the Federalists in the 1816
35

Winkler ultimately asserts that in Dartmouth College and later cases, the Supreme Court
recognized corporations’ civil rights by a transitive property. He argues that, rather than existing
as legal persons independently, corporations merely assert their members’ individual rights. See
Winkler, supra note 4, at 66–68, 86–87. The Court’s language in the Dartmouth decision, however,
tracks the traditional interpretation more closely. Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion states that the
“properties” of this “artificial being . . . are considered as the same, and may act as a single
individual.” Trustees, 17 U.S. at 636. Story’s opinion does note that as “an artificial person . . . [a
corporation’s rights] must be exercised through the medium of its natural members,” but this
qualification appears more logistical than substantive—that as practical matter, corporations rely
on their members to pursue their purposes and civil rights. Trustees, 17 U.S. at 667 (Story, J.,
concurring).
Justice Story goes on to emphasize that because of their “collective
character . . . [corporations] posses[s] certain immunities, privileges and capacities . . . which do
not belong to the natural persons composing it,” that their artificial personhood is “considered as
subsisting in the corporation itself, as distinctly as if it were a real personage,” and that “a
corporation may sue and be sued by its own members . . . as with any strangers.” Id. at 667–668.
Each of these clauses strongly suggests a legal entity endowed with independent, recognizable
rights and status, rather than one reliant on its members’ rights. See also Newmyer, Justice Joseph
Story’s Doctrine, supra note 24, at 827–28 (discussing how the Dartmouth College Case impacted the
understanding of corporation’s rights and their legal source).
36

Joseph Story, Life and Letters of Joseph Story 331 (William W. Story ed., 1851). Story’s
exchange with Chancellor Kent, facilitated by Daniel Webster himself, reveals how Webster and
Story coordinated their legal efforts in the Dartmouth College case. Story wanted the Court to rule
on private corporations’ rights, and Webster wanted Dartmouth’s victory. Story advised Webster
to bring three suits separate from the Dartmouth College case, all involving state authority over
non-charitable corporations, and then coordinated with the circuit court judge so that they could
be accelerated to the Supreme Court. The Court never heard these other three cases; there was no
need, inasmuch as Story incorporated his views on private corporations’ rights into his Dartmouth
College case concurrence. While Story was writing his concurrence, Webster sent sources and
citations to the Justice to incorporate into his opinion. For more discussion of Justice Story’s
coordination with Daniel Webster, see Christopher M. Joseph, Joseph Story and the Darthmouth
College Case, supra note 22, at 24–25.
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election, and the newly elected Governor, William Plumer, advocated Thomas
Jefferson’s vision of a non-sectarian university that prepared young men for
vocations beyond the ministry.37 In its Dartmouth College decision, the Supreme
Court struck down the recent state laws that would have transformed Dartmouth
College into Dartmouth University and given the Governor extensive authority in
selecting the institution’s trustees and overseers. The Court’s decision halted the
legislative transformation, thereby preserving a small, Calvinist, religious
institution that was far less ideologically open and academically ambitious than the
“University” Governor Plumer and the Republicans sought.38 Arguably, the case’s
winners were conventional and narrow-minded, and its losers, broad-minded
reformers.
Still, independent of its impact in Hanover, the Dartmouth College decision
protected all private colleges and universities—including those that served or would
serve marginalized groups otherwise excluded from higher education in the
nineteenth century. It is no coincidence that America’s first women’s colleges were
founded in the decision’s wake, beginning with Ipswich and Mount Holyoke in 1828
and 1837, respectively.39 Similarly, though only six Roman Catholic colleges existed
before the Dartmouth College case, an additional thirty-four were founded in the
subsequent three decades.40 And, apparently encouraged by the Dartmouth College
decision, “dozens more religiously affiliated private colleges sprung up throughout
New England.”41
The Dartmouth College decision’s corporate protections deserve renewed
historical attention for their role in empowering discrete, insular groups against
public aggression or antagonism. In the remainder of this essay, we focus on the
history of private colleges established in the nineteenth century for the education of
African-Americans. We propose that the Dartmouth College case planted a legal seed
that, decades later, contributed to the forming and flourishing of institutions

37

Stites, supra note 27, at 13 (describing Governor Plumer’s belief that it was “mistaken that
the great object of colleges was to educate young men for priesthood, rather than to qualify them
for the duties of civil life”). See also id. at 126, n. 33 (noting that Governor Plumer’s admiration for
Thomas Jefferson was so profound that he sent Mr. Jefferson a copy of remarks he had written).
38

Lynn W. Turner, William Plumer of New Hampshire 1759-1850 247–49 (1962).

39

Helen Lefkwoitz Horowitz, Alma Mater: Design and Experience in Women’s
Colleges from Their Nineteenth Century Beginnings to the 1930s 9, 11 (2nd ed. 1984).
40

Matthew Garrett, The Identity of American Catholic Higher Education: A Historical Overview, 10 J.
Cath. Educ. 229, 230–31 (2006).
41

Joel Richard Paul, Without Precedent: John Marshall and His Times 380 (2018).
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devoted to the education of newly-freed men—and, often, women42—in former
slave states, despite unparalleled public hostility.
I I I . P U B L I C E D U C A T I ON A N D A F R I C A N- A ME R I C A N S A F T E R T H E C I V I L
WA R

Before the Civil War, slavery and segregation categorically foreclosed
educational opportunities for nearly all black Americans, though a few institutions
of higher learning for black students had been founded in areas of Pennsylvania and
Ohio harboring strong abolitionist sentiment.43 At War’s end, ninety-four percent
of America’s black population lived in the former Confederacy and, due to
prohibitions against educating slaves, ninety percent of them were illiterate.44
Emancipation alone could not materially improve their educational opportunities.45
To be sure, public education in the former Confederacy grew significantly after
the War. While the North had developed public elementary and secondary schools
beginning in the seventeenth century, the South had never systematically
established public schools.46 White businessmen and small farmers clamored for
free public schools for their children but faced class-based resistance from wealthy
landowners fearing socioeconomic disruption.47
Divided as white Southerners might have been over public education for whites,
they were united in opposing educational opportunities for their black neighbors.
Historians Henry Drewry and Humphrey Doermann detail how “[b]lack schools
were burned; teachers and students harassed or attacked; and black parents fired
from jobs if their children were known to be attending school.” 48 Such entrenched
and uniform racist hostility blocked nearly all possibility of state-supported
education for African-Americans—including elementary and secondary schools—
during and, except for the brief period of Reconstruction, after the Civil War.49
42

Henry N. Drewry & Humphrey Doermann, Stand and Prosper: Private Black
Colleges and Their Students 44 (2012) (“Colonial colleges [almost all in the North] enrolled
only males, whereas in early black colleges, coeducation was common.”).
43

Ronyelle Bertrand Ricard & M. Christopher Brown II, Ebony Towers in Higher
Education: The Evolution, Mission, and Presidency of Historically Black Colleges and
Universities 8 (2008).
44

Drewry, supra note 42, at 34 (2012).

45

Id. at 34.

46

Id. at 42.

47

Id. at 34, 41-43.

48

Id. at 43.

49

Id. at 34–36, 43.
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In 1862, Congress had passed the Morrill Land Grant Act, which provided
federal land for states to create liberal and practical educational institutions.50
Sixty-nine land grant schools were quickly founded throughout the United States,
creating a national, public higher education network.51 The Morrill Act was a boon
for white Americans in the South. For most black Americans, however, the first
Morrill Act never existed in any practical sense. The white Southerners who
controlled their states’ legislatures and distributed the Morrill Act’s resources
refused to spend them on black higher education,52 just as after Reconstruction they
refused to appropriate state tax revenues to support primary and secondary
education for black citizens.53
Eventually, Congress responded to Southern legislatures’ discriminatory use of
federal funds. In 1890, it passed the Second Morrill Act, which required as a
condition of federal support that states admit black students to existing white landgrant colleges or create “colleges separately for white and colored students . . . [with
an] equitable division” of its funds.54 The Second Morrill Act’s benefits were limited
in the South; there was insufficient federal oversight and enforcement, and the Act

50

7 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. See John A. Moore, Are State-Supported Historically Black Colleges and
Universities Justifiable after Fordice – A Higher Education Dilemma, 27 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 547, 550
(2000). For more, see Kristen Broady’s discussion, of how although a provision of the Morrill Act
withheld benefits from any states currently in rebellion or insurrection against the United
States—which included, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina,
Texas, Arkansas, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia—its relevance was short-lived with the
War’s 1865 conclusion. After the Civil War, these states could and did receive federal land grants,
but they continued to forbid black Americans from attending the universities those grants helped
create. Kristen E. Broady et al., Dreaming and Doing at Georgia HBCUs: Continued Relevancy in ‘PostRacial’ America, 44 Rev. Black Pol. Econ. 37, 39 (2017).
51

Id. at 39.

52

The Unique Role and Mission of Historically Black Colleges and Universities: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Postsecondary Educ. of the Comm. on Educ. and Labor H. R., 100th Cong. 12 (1988)
(statement of Dr. Robert L. Albright, President, Johnson C. Smith University).
53

See also Drewry, supra note 42, at 41–42 (discussing how, using perverted logic, state
legislatures rationalized their discriminatory refusal to provide public funds for black education
by arguing that, since public-school funds came from property taxes and black Americans owned
little-to-no property, any black schools should not be allowed access to public revenue; yet whites
without property could still send their children to the new public schools, which children of taxpaying black citizens were barred from attending).

54

Racial Discrimination by Colleges Restricted, 7 U.S.C. § 323 (1890).
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essentially codified the illusory and denigrating concept of “separate but equal.”55
Although sixteen Southern and Border states created public colleges for the
education of black students, these were grossly underfunded.56
Even after the Second Morrill Act, then, Southern state legislatures’ racism
foreclosed public higher education. Private higher education remained the only
option available to most black Americans, the majority of whom remained in the
South.
I V . T HE F O U N D I N G O F B L A C K C O L L E G E S

No historian seems to have connected the Dartmouth College decision—and its
recognition of private educational institutions’ rights—to the rise of black colleges
in former Confederacy and Border states immediately after the Civil War. That
said, several scholars have recognized that these colleges existed precisely because
they were private institutions. Historians Drewry and Doermann hypothesize that
“[t]he widespread opposition [to higher education for black citizens during this
period] suggests why the private and not the public sector took the lead in providing
black education.”57 Another scholar, Kristen Broady, agrees that “African Americans
in [Southern] states . . . relied on private [historically black colleges and universities]
as they were prohibited from attending white institutions,” private or public.58
The Dartmouth College decision had quickly enshrined the proposition that
private corporations—and specifically “private eleemosynary” institutions—were
significantly shielded from state government interference.59 In this way, decades
55

It is notable that Congress, not the Supreme Court, seems to have been the first federal
department to approve the concept of “separate but equal” as compatible with the Fourteenth
Amendment. Cf. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 543-44 (1896).
56

Reginald Wilson, Can Black Colleges Solve the Problem of Access for Black Students, 98 Am. J. Educ.
443, 446 (1990) (reporting that the Second Morrill Act resulted in the establishment of sixteen black
colleges, which remained “systematically underfunded by both federal and state sources”). See also
Travis J. Albritton, Educating Our Own: The Historical Legacy of HBCUs and Their Relevance for
Educating a New Generation of Leaders,” 44 Urb. Rev. 311, 316 (2012) (“‘State funding for Alabama’s
black land-grant institution remained constant at $4,000 annually. Unlike its white counterpart,
whose state funding averaged $65,000 yearly between 1900 and 1916, at no time during the period
did the black college benefit from special appropriations ‘to meet the growth in enrollment and
the advancing cost of maintenance.’”).
57

Drewry, supra note 42, at 34.

58

Broady, supra note 50, at 39.

59

See, e.g., Visitors of St. John’s Coll. v. State, 15 Md. 330, 374 (1860) (“The leading and controlling
case on this subject is that of Dartmouth College v[]. Woodward, . . . argued at great length and with
rare ability. The judgment pronounced in it, has been the settled law of the land ever since.”); see
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later, the case provided a legal route for black Americans to pursue higher education
in a virulently hostile South. Especially between 1862 and 1890, Southern blacks and
their supporters embraced the private corporate form the Dartmouth College case
protected as a tool to defend and advance human dignity.60
Despite the enormous challenge of simultaneously establishing primary and
advanced educational opportunities, Northern freedmen’s societies, religious
missionary groups, and black Southern communities, assisted by the Freedmen’s
Bureau that Congress established in 1865,61 partnered to charter private schools for
newly freed slaves. Many of these started as primary or secondary schools and later
evolved into private, higher education institutions.62
Only a few years after Appomattox, the Dartmouth College decision’s protection
of private charitable corporations had transformed the educational horizon of black
Americans. Between 1866 and 1870, the number of private black educational
institutions, including grade schools and high schools, in the United States
increased from 740 to 2,677.63 An 1870 report by the Freedmen’s Bureau listed
ninety-five “Advanced Schools and Colleges for black Students” (meaning high
schools and colleges), almost all of them in former Confederate or Border states.64
Some of the most famous and prestigious private black universities were
established during this period, including Shaw University, in North Carolina, in
also Allen v. McKean, 1 F. Cas. 492, 497 (C.C.D. Me. 1833) (Story, Circuit Justice) (relying on the
Dartmouth College case, abrogating Maine’s annulment of Bowdoin College’s charter, and holding
that “no authority exists in the government to regulate, control, or direct a corporation, or its
funds,” if it is an eleemosynary corporation, founded with private monies).
60

Broady, supra note 50, at 39, 41.

61

Drewry, supra note 42, at 35–40.

62

Ricard, supra note 43, at 8. In this way, their development paralleled Dartmouth’s.
Dartmouth College grew out of Eleazer Wheelock’s unchartered “Moor’s Charity School,” a
secondary school that continued to exist for some years even after Dartmouth College began
admitting students. Stites, supra note 27, at 2–3.

63

Thomas Jesse Jones, Bureau of Edu. Dep’t of Interior, The Freedmen’s Bureau and Southern
Schools, in Negro Education: A Study of the Private and Higher Schools for Colored
People in the United States 38, at 289 (1917), reprinted in Drewry, supra note 42, at 40. See also
Wilson, supra note 56, at 443 (noting that, although the first college devoted to the education of
African-Americans was founded before the Civil War in 1837—Cheyney University in
Pennsylvania, “the overwhelming majority were begun after 1865 in response to two concerns: the
need to quickly establish institutions to educate the newly freed slaves and the segregationist
sentiments of southern educators who opposed integrating blacks into already-existing white
schools and colleges.”).
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Drewry, supra note 42, at 48, commenting on John W. Alvord, Freedmen’s Schools, 52–54
(1980).
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1865; Fisk University, in Tennessee, in 1866; and Howard University, in the District
of Columbia, in 1867.65 The historian Reginald Wilson underscores that private
black colleges, beyond the reach of prejudiced state governments, continued to
“carr[y] the substantial responsibility of educating blacks at the college level” until
the late 1930s.66
It is true that after the Dartmouth College case, state governments, picking up on
Story’s caveat in his concurring opinion,67 generally adopted a “reserve” provision
subjecting all state-issued charters to possible legislative modification.68 But we
have found no record that legislatures exercised such reserved power upon the
private black colleges and universities established in the Civil War’s wake. Southern
legislatures seem to have simply ignored these schools.
America’s higher education institutions have evolved dramatically since the
1930s, not to mention since the 1819 Dartmouth College decision. The decision’s clear
distinction between public and private colleges, whose full significance was
probably uncertain in 1819,69 has blurred with time.70 Today, public and private
funds support virtually all U.S. colleges and universities, and non-discrimination
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intrude into their affairs. . . . [T]he original Dartmouth trustees . . . forced a final determination
of the distinction that we now know between private and public higher education.”). But see
Whitehead, supra note 2, at 337 (arguing that the growth in government funding for colleges after
the Civil War perhaps contributed to the “emergence of the private/public distinction” in higher
education, which Whitehead believes was a “post-[Civil] war phenomenon.”).
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CommonWealth (June
15,
2019),
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and other state and federal laws apply equally to all such institutions.71 Judge Henry
Friendly, in a 1968 address at Dartmouth commemorating the sesquicentennial of
Daniel Webster’s argument, famously subtitled his lecture the “public-private
penumbra.”72
Still, it appears that in the Civil War’s aftermath, the Dartmouth College case’s
recognition of private charitable corporations was pivotal. The protections it
guaranteed provided a legal alternative for newly emancipated black Americans
who ardently sought education and were denied access to both private white
institutions and public support.
***
The Dartmouth College case did “Refound” Dartmouth College, as the plaque at
Webster Hall says, but our traditional appreciation of the decision has been too
circumscribed. Undoubtedly, it contributed to the American corporate economy’s
transformation. And, by creating and protecting the category of private
eleemosynary institutions, the Dartmouth College decision also had important
implications for black Americans’ struggle for education. In ways that even Justice
Story could not have fully comprehended, the decision would help preempt “undue
encroachments upon civil rights.”73
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